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The diplomatic history of World War II has been widely covered by historians. Historians 
have largely agreed that the relationship among Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin began to 
deteriorate as the war was coming to an end, but largely disagree as to why this is so. Many 
historians acknowledge the fact that negotiations on Poland were a serious issue at the Yalta 
Conference and contributed to the downfall of the alliance but fall short of labeling it as the main 
factor. Historians such as Jon Meacham and Vladislav Zubok tend to tell a broader timeline of 
the alliance and examine the uncertainty of Poland as a part of that story, but do not largely focus 
on the details. Others including Charles G. Stefan and David Reynolds discuss at length the 
details of Yalta Conference. Others largely view Yalta and Poland as being an important 
contributor to the downfall of the alliance. Ultimately, historians largely do not discuss the 
publics’ opinion on the Yalta agreements, and I believe that this is an area of importance which 
needs exploration, especially regarding Poland. It is my view that Poland was the central issue at 
the Yalta Conference which resulted in a compromise that favored Stalin. This was revealed in 
the actions taken by the Russians following the meeting. The West’s alliance with Russia 
deteriorated as a direct result of Polish agreements and it is important to understand public 







Historians who see Poland’s Importance 
 
Jon Meacham’s Franklin and Winston: An Intimate Portrait of an Epic Friendship, largely 
focused on the progression of the relationship between the Big Three which was supported by 
the evolution of events during World War II. The work is divided into three parts, in which the 
third “Part III: The Chill of Autumn: Fall 1943 to the End,” depicted the relationship between 
the Big Three from the Teheran Conference to President Roosevelt’s death. Although the book 
largely focused on the relationship between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill, 
Meacham discussed how their relationship changed between the two as President Roosevelt 
increased focus on Secretary General Joseph Stalin and the Soviet Union. Meacham utilized a 
variety of sources including direct communications between leaders, family members’ accounts 
of events between leaders such as Eleanor Roosevelt and Clementine Churchill and accounts 
from officials and diplomats, for example, Harry Hopkins, Charles Bohlen and Frederick 
Lindemann. These sources were utilized to give outside perspectives of the relationship between 
Roosevelt and Churchill. Meacham identified Poland as being one of the large issues, in addition 
to the establishment of the United Nations, which arose at the Yalta Conference and was subject 
to hours and hours of debate. At the time, Poland was controlled by the Red Army and greatly 
affected discourse. There were disputes over borders and the postwar Polish government, but 
ultimately Stalin made vague promises about free elections in the Declaration of Liberated 
Europe. Meacham argued that Roosevelt and Churchill gave their best effort to build an orderly 
relationship with the Russians with the hope of achieving orderly settlements. Meacham utilized 





largely avoided extensive discussion on the Polish question but acknowledged that Poland was a 
main cause of friction between the West and the Russians.1 
Vladislav Zubok utilized an in-depth analysis and perspective of Stalin and the Soviet Union 
to explain how and why the alliance between the Big Three fell apart. Zubok opposed several 
stances such as that the alliance fell through due to the delay in the opening of the Second Front 
while supporting that the root cause of the decay was due to the uncertainty of Central and 
Eastern Europe. Also, the contrast of Roosevelt’s optimism, friendliness and transparency paired 
with Stalin’s power-driven, realist and cynical perspectives were utilized throughout the work. 
Zubok also cited perspectives of the Soviet population, diplomats, and officials to contribute to 
his arguments. However, the work only mentioned that the Yalta Conference was a great victory 
for Stalin’s statesmanship in which waves of optimism were felt throughout Soviet 
bureaucracies. The government was particularly excited about the agreements reached on Polish 
and Yugoslav issues. However, he did not describe the details of the conference. Zubok also 
noted that President Roosevelt was irate over the news of the Soviet occupation methods in 
Eastern Europe, but it was Truman who accused the Soviets of breaking Yalta agreements on 
Poland.2  
John Lewis Gaddis examined the alliance between the Big Three using a broad timeline from 
when the leaders first began cooperating until the alliance fell apart. Gaddis argued that the 
alliance was flawed from the beginning due to Roosevelt’s framework of principle and 
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pragmatism that Roosevelt hoped to cooperate with Stalin. Furthermore, it was Stalin’s paranoia 
of his allies, in particular Churchill, which contributed to the flawed relationship. Gaddis’ 
interpretation of the alliance between the Big Three was that it was Stalin who was to blame for 
the breakdown of the alliance due to his suspicion, distrust and cynicism. Gaddis did not discuss 
the details of the Yalta Conference and largely focused on Stalin’s views and actions on Poland 
and Eastern Europe. Gaddis outlined Stalin’s previous actions in Poland during his Nazi-Soviet 
Pact where he authorized the murder of thousands of Polish officers. Therefore, Stalin had to 
repair those damages later during the war and recognized the Lublin Poles, a puppet regime, 
instead of recognizing the London Poles in exile who were calling for an investigation of Stalin’s 
atrocities. Although Stalin obtained the Polish government that he wanted, it came a large cost 
which laid the foundations for resistance that would grow in time. It was Stalin himself who had 
persuaded the West that the Russians could be trusted.3 
David Reynolds largely talked of the alliance in terms of military history in, From World 
War to Cold War: Churchill, Roosevelt, and the International History of the 1940’s. Reynolds 
examined the changing relationship within the alliance as the war progressed, especially from the 
buildup to Operation Overlord to the race to Berlin. Furthermore, Reynolds argued that officials 
in London and Washington were too hopeful that Stalin could be trusted and co-opted into a 
post-war concert based on an open sphere of influence in Eastern Europe. The wartime alliance 
was grounded on faith in Stalin. Ultimately, the alliance changed dramatically as large 
achievements were being made on the eastern front while the second front was moving faster 
than Churchill envisioned, shifting the balance of the alliance to the Soviet Union and the United 
                                                     






States. This time period is analyzed from a realist point of view in which the balance of power 
and spheres of influence were becoming a pressing matter for the future of Europe. Reynolds 
studied how the relationship deteriorated as a result of Stalin’s military achievements made from 
1943 through 1945. Reynolds did not focus on the details of the Yalta Conference and instead, 




Historians who see Yalta’s Importance 
 
Charles G. Stefan outlined and analyzed the events of the Yalta Conference in his work 
“Yalta Revisited: An Update in the Diplomacy of FDR and His Wartime Summit Partners.” 
Stefan articulated that the Yalta Conference was the climax of the alliance and quickly crumbled 
after due to an escalation in Soviet actions. Only after the fall of the Soviet Union was 
Roosevelt’s and Churchill’s for Eastern Europe were achieved. The paper covered topics which 
were discussed by the Big Three including: the partition and occupation zones of Germany and 
Poland, the establishment of the United Nations, Soviet participation in the war against Japan, 
and the Declaration of Liberated Europe. Stefan noted that some negotiations went much 
smoother and easier than others, which sparked intense debate and compromises. Each leader 
came to the meeting with a different set of priorities. Stefan also specifically examined the 
evolution of the Big Three’s attitudes between the end of the conference and the death of 
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President Roosevelt. In doing so, Stefan largely focused on Poland utilizing various accounts 
from the Big Three and officials who attended the conference. The importance of Poland was 
stressed in the acknowledgement that it was discussed in seven out of the eight plenary meetings 
and despite the efforts by Churchill and Roosevelt, neither were able to achieve the kind of 
agreement on Poland initially sought.5  
In another work by David Reynolds, Summits: Six Meetings That Shaped the Twentieth 
Century, Reynolds analyzed the Yalta Conference of 1945. Reynolds took two approaches to 
analyze why the Yalta agreement played a significant role in the breakdown of the alliance. First, 
Reynolds outlined that the leaders came to the meeting with different priorities and goals. 
President Roosevelt’s and the Americans prioritized solving the differences over the construction 
of the United Nations Organization and Stalin’s commitment to an early entry into the war 
against Japan. Winston Churchill and the British deemed the future of Europe and the avoidance 
of punitive reparations against Germany to be of utmost importance. Although Stalin’s priorities 
at Yalta are harder to examine due to less documentation, it is clear from his behavior at Yalta 
that he raised the possibility of dismembering Germany, presented precise demands for 
substantial reparations from the defeated enemy, and also stressed the importance over the 
“Polish question.” Second, the diplomatic maneuvers enacted by the leaders helped deteriorate 
the alliance. Reynolds concluded that it was these rifts which contributed to the breakdown of the 
alliance. Yalta was not the moment when the Big Three divided Europe nor was it the sellout of 
Eastern Europe to the Soviets; influence was in the hands of the Soviets as a result of military 
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achievement and agreements reached at Tehran in 1943. Roosevelt and Churchill sought to 
contain the Soviet influence at Yalta. Reynolds did discuss Poland at length and acknowledged 
that the dynamics of the conference were very different on the issue of Poland because Churchill 
and Roosevelt knew that Stalin had the upper hand. Understanding the situation, the West 
pleaded for some concessions by Stalin to assist them with public opinion. Reynolds discussed 
the agreements on the Polish border and formation of the government to argue that the 
Americans were more interested in moral sentiments than hard details and that the applicability 
of the Declaration of Liberated Europe to Poland was vague generalities.6 
 
Historians who see the Importance of Poland and Yalta 
 
Vladimir Pechatnov’s paper, “The Big Three after World War II: New Documents on Soviet 
Thinking about Post-War Relations with the United States and Great Britain,” reflected several 
views of Soviet officials from 1944-1945. The documents of Litinov, Maisky and Gromkyo are 
used to present viewpoints of preliminary intentions before the events of V-Day, Hiroshima, and 
other large events which continuously changed the perceptions and behavior among the Big 
Three. Pechatnov studied this time period by analyzing the realist approach from the Kremlin in 
terms of spheres of influence and balance of power. Pechatnov argued that Russia’s main priority 
was security, and having an independent and vigorous Poland, but one that was not too large or 
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strong, was essential to the security of Russia; a Poland who would become a friend in the 
future.7 
Lehram discussed the relationship between the Big Three by examining the individual 
communications between Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin. The work also utilized written and 
verbal accounts from officials and family members. Some accounts include opinions from 
Eleanor Roosevelt and Clementine Churchill on their views of each other’s husbands. 
Furthermore, Lehram discussed rifts between the alliance due to repayment from the Lend-Lease 
debts, British colonial intentions, Roosevelt’s attempts to distance himself from a special Anglo-
American relationship, and policy differences at the Teheran and Yalta Conferences. There was 
no one definitive rift which caused the deterioration of the alliance and the subject is left as a 
broad decline of the alliance. Lehram argued that it was Roosevelt who caused the growing 
separation between himself and Churchill. He also largely focused on the relationship between 
Roosevelt and Churchill and would discuss Stalin in terms of how he impacted their relationship. 
Instead of focusing on fine details of the Yalta Conference, Lehram directed his attention more to 
the deterioration of the alliance. That being said, Lehram did acknowledge that Roosevelt had 
previously failed to take up serious issues regarding Poland’s future, despite the fact that the 
American Polish constituency was loyal to the Democratic Party. Furthermore, the United States 
and Britain had little leverage in Eastern European matters and the final draft of the Allied 
declaration on Poland reflected that fact; it was an act of surrender to the Soviets.8 
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Melvyn P. Leffler’s article, “Adherence to Agreements: Yalta and the Experiences of the 
Early Cold War” examined several topics including: the establishment of a Polish border and 
government, the Manhattan Project, the Percentages Agreement, and the Declaration of 
Liberated Europe. Leffler argued that it was the search for spheres of influence that caused the 
alliance to fall apart. Leffler discussed the final agreements reached on Poland at Yalta but did 
not discuss the details from the conference. Instead, Leffler plainly stated the fact that this was a 
compromise and that there was littler that the West could do after the conference. The conclusion 
was that the relationship broke down as a result of miscommunication and misinterpretation of 
the Yalta Conference. Ultimately, the situation worsened due the West’s overselling of the 





Historians have generally concurred that the alliance between the Big Three ended with the 
Yalta Conference but largely differ on why it did. Mostly, historians use the “Polish question” as 
part of the story as to why the alliance fell apart towards the end of the war but avoid labeling it 
as the main issue. I argue that Poland was the central factor to the deterioration of the alliance 
and needs to be examined more closely. I strongly agree with Diana Preston’s recent work, Eight 
Days at Yalta: How Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin Shaped the Post-War World which closely 
examined the proceedings of the Yalta Conference, and in doing so, revealed the importance of 
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Poland.10 Therefore, a close examination of the debates on Poland at the conference is essential 
to understand the “Polish question” and its effect on the Big Three’s alliance after the 
conference. I believe that Poland was the central issue at Yalta due to the large amount of debate 
during the conference, which will be revealed in the Bohlen Minutes in Chapter 1. Furthermore, 
the telegrams sent between the Big Three reveal that it was Stalin’s actions in Poland after Yalta 
that crippled the alliance and paved a path to the Cold War. Following the Conference, the 
democratic bases of Franklin D. Roosevelt and Winston Churchill were quick to point out the 
failures in their leader’s dealings regarding Poland at the Yalta Conference despite attempts to 
oversell the Conference as a major success. Seeing as though this was the central issue at Yalta, 
it is equally important to understand the views of the public regarding the decisions reached on 
Poland. Preston also frequently discussed the importance of public opinion throughout her work 
which I believe is an essential aspect of the Yalta Conference.11 The agreements on Poland at 
Yalta quickly unraveled and it is just as important to understand the domestic opinion on this as 
it is to understand President Roosevelt’s and Prime Minister Churchill’s opinions. Other areas 
which need further examination include how the Yalta Conference was portrayed by President 
Roosevelt to Congress and the views of Republicans and Democrats. 
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Before the Conference: 
 
 
From August 9th through the 10th in 1941, President Roosevelt and Prime Minister 
Churchill met aboard the U.S.S Augusta to discuss their war aims and outline a postwar 
international system. The Atlantic Charter which was drafted included eight principles that the 
two states would be committed to in the postwar world. The eight principles included: both 
countries would not seek territorial expansion, establish freedom of the seas, international labor, 
economic and welfare standards, and liberalize international trade. Most importantly, the United 
States and Britain would support the restoration of self-government for all countries occupied 
during the war and allow all peoples to choose their own form of government.12 The Atlantic 
Charter is vital to understand in order to properly analyze the Yalta Conference and to better 
understand critics’ reactions to the agreements reached in 1945.  
Immediately before the conference, Churchill wanted a preconference session with 
Roosevelt. Churchill determined that a meeting alone with Roosevelt before beginning talks with 
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Stalin was essential to the success of the Yalta Conference. Roosevelt agreed to a conference 
with Churchill in Malta aboard the Quincy before convening with Stalin at Yalta. The meeting 
was a letdown to Churchill due to Roosevelt’s avoidance of serious discussions because he 
preferred to wait for the sessions with Stalin.13 David Reynolds noted in Summits: Six Meetings 
That Shaped the Twentieth Century, that Roosevelt did not want to give Stalin the impression of 
an Anglo-American front.14 Another factor was that Roosevelt “Vainly believed that he could 
charm and flatter Stalin.”15 Ultimately, Roosevelt determined that it was best to avoid bilateral 
discussions. In regard to military advancements being made during the time, the Soviets were in 
control of most of Eastern Europe by the time the Big Three met in Yalta. The West could not 
evict the Red Army except by force which they were not willing or able to do.16 Therefore, the 
West was negotiating out of a weak starting point and falsely believed that they could build a 
cooperative relationship with Stalin. The statement by Stalin in April 1945 exemplifies his plan 
for Yalta; that “Everyone imposes his own system as far as his army has to power to do so.”17 
Due to fact that the Red Army’s success had led to a sphere of influence in Eastern Europe, it 
would prove to be increasingly difficult to maintain the vision of the Atlantic Charter at Yalta, 
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specifically the restoration of self-government for all countries occupied during the war and to 
allow all peoples to choose their own form of government. 
 
During the Conference: 
 
From February 4th through the 11th, President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill and 
Stalin met in Crimea to begin to solidify decisions regarding the future progress of the war and 
the postwar world.18 Each respective leader and their teams of diplomats came to Yalta with 
specific goals. At Yalta, the Allied Powers met to discuss the unconditional surrender of 
Germany, Russian entry into the Japanese front, the creation of the United Nations, the future of 
Eastern Europe, and more. Although major agreements were accomplished through the 
diplomatic efforts, they were not accomplished without debate and compromises. There was 
tension regarding all topics and the topic of Poland became the clear focus of the Yalta 
Conference. Questions over Poland’s border and the establishment of a provisional government 
sparked debate and compromises which resulted in the recognition of the Curzon Line and a 
provisional government which would feature free elections. Poland was the central issue at the 
conference and cause of the rift within the alliance.  
For each day a Plenary Meeting was scheduled which would include the Big Three and 
selected diplomats. Charles Bohlen, who was one of the selected diplomats, recorded the 
discussions which took place during the Plenary Meetings. Bohlen was a lifelong diplomat and 
Soviet expert who served with George Kennan from 1933 – 1944 in the Soviet Union. The two 
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were both graduates from Eastern European Division of the State Department. Eventually, 
Bohlen was sent back to D.C. in 1935 after the breakup of the Eastern European Division but 
returned from 1938 – 1941. Bohlen was open to cooperation with the Russians and 
acknowledged the ruthless dictatorship of the Soviet system. Due to his direct contact with 
Roosevelt and Stalin, Bohlen developed a personal loyalty to Roosevelt and especially to Harry 
Hopkins.19 There were eight Plenary Meetings, one for each day of the Conference. Bohlen  
Poland was discussed in all meetings with a particular focus during meetings three through seven 
and increased in debate as days proceeded. The seventh day consisted of drafting a final 
agreement which largely focused on the language.20 Bohlen’s minutes have often been neglected 
by historians and are rarely used. Historians Jon Meacham utilized Bohlen throughout their 
works but did not use the Yalta minutes often.21 Lewis E. Lehram also utilized the perspective of 
Charles E. Bohlen but neglected his minutes of the conference.22 Seeing as though Bohlen 
attended and took notes at every Plenary Meeting, his minutes are essential to understanding how 
the Polish question was handled at Yalta and therefore, will be heavily utilized in this section. 
Bohlen’s minutes offer a unique perspective into the inner functions of the alliance and 
revealed the diplomatic maneuvers, progression, disagreements, and compromises. After reading 
Bohlen’s minutes, it became clear that the absence of Polish representation at Yalta was an issue 
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which was brought up on numerous occasions, especially by President Roosevelt. I believe that 
the leaders knew there would be a tension and criticism between what was reached at Yalta and 
what was stated in the Atlantic Charter, and therefore opted to exclude Polish representation 
from the meeting. Even before the conference, Churchill believed that all the Balkans, except 
Greece, were going to be Bolshevized and that there was “nothing I can do for poor Poland 
either.”23 There was a last-minute effort during the conference to have Polish representation at 
the meeting by President Roosevelt, but ultimately there was not enough time for them to 
arrive.24 After the conference, Roosevelt acknowledged that the agreement was the best that he 
could do for Poland.25 The Polish thus had no say in their future. Unlike Stalin, Roosevelt and 
Churchill had to worry about dissenting opinions in the government and public and this is 
perhaps why they attempted to oversell the agreement.  
Poland was discussed at length during the 4th plenary meeting on February 7th at Yalta. 
Molotov gave proposals in regard to the Polish question which included the Polish border and 
the establishment of the Provisional Polish Government. The President approved of the progress 
made in light of Molotov’s suggestions and offered few amendments. Molotov also addressed 
Roosevelt’s suggestion that Poles come to Crimea and that the Russians attempted to contact 
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them but were unable to reach them.26 In actuality, Stalin blocked repeated Western requests to 
bring Polish communist leaders from Warsaw to Yalta and claimed that it was impossible to 
reach them by phone. Stalin’s carefully timed concession on the United Nations talks was 
intended to extract something in return over Poland.27 Poland was one of the top priorities for 
Stalin heading into the conference. Stalin believed that a quiescent client state in Poland, which 
had historically has been the gateway for German aggression, was key to the security of Russia. 
Generally, Stalin wished to regain territories lost from World War I including eastern Poland and 
Baltic territory and to expand around the Black Sea.28 The concept of territorial security was 
essential to Stalin’s regime and therefore was a driving point of his at the conference. 
Prime Minister Churchill would often write to officials in London, especially the War 
Cabinet, to keep them up to date on the proceedings of the conference. Prime Minister Churchill 
cabled the Deputy Prime Minister and the War Cabinet to relay the progress being made at the 
Yalta Conference on February 8, 1945. Here, he tried to shed a positive light on the agreements 
being reached on Poland. Churchill began his message by stating that they had a “much better 
day” at the Conference because parties were beginning to accept proposals. Churchill was 
especially excited to announce the progress on Poland. He described how President Roosevelt 
drafted a letter, which the British amended, that proposed that “the existing Lublin Government 
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should give place to a new all Polish Government containing representatives both from the Poles 
abroad and those within Poland.” Churchill argued that the plan was to fight hard for a Polish 
Government that the West could recognize. The goal would be to put forward a number of Poles 
who would be placed into the Lublin Government so that foundations would be laid for “the free, 
fair and unfettered” elections which would give the Polish state “life and being.”29 It should be 
noted that there were two groups of Poles being discussed at the conference. One was the exiled 
Polish government in London and the other was the “Lublin Poles” which was a provisional 
government in Warsaw that was established by the Soviets.30 He was proud that the Big Three 
were coming to conclusions over the Polish question but acknowledged that it had not been, nor 
would it be, an easy fight to win. Churchill was overselling the agreement to officials in London. 
Bohlen recorded minutes of the sixth plenary meeting on February 9, 1945 at Yalta in 
which the Big Three and respected diplomats discussed various topics including Poland. Prime 
Minister Churchill agreed that progress had been made but wished to emphasize two points. One, 
which applied directly to the formation of a new Polish government, stated that the new situation 
that had been created due to the complete liberation of Poland by the Red Army called for a 
government more “broadly based.” Furthermore, it was stated by Churchill that “this might be an 
ornament but nevertheless an important ornament.” Churchill also questioned the flow of 
accurate information coming from Poland. Later, discussion began regarding who was to be 
permitted to participate in the new Polish Government. Marshal Stalin concluded that “this was a 
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matter which should be discussed in the presence of the Poles,” being the Lublin Poles, but 
Churchill stated that “he thought this was a matter which was necessary to carry through and that 
it was important to assure the House of Commons that free elections would be held in Poland.” 
The topic was left at the time.31 Discussion of Poland took up the majority of the sixth plenary 
meeting and displayed the potential motives of Prime Minister Churchill. From this meeting, it 
appeared as though the Prime Minister was primarily concerned with creating a good agreement 
which would be approved by officials in London. If Churchill truly believed that the term 
“broadly based” was ornamental in purposes for approval from London, then it is not surprising 
that Stalin acted the way he did in Poland. Stalin fully understood his military presence in Poland 
and the overall broadness of the agreement and therefore, knew he would implement them in the 
way he wanted.  
Poland was once again one of the primary topics at the 7th plenary meeting on February 
10, 1945. The discussion between the Big Three and diplomats largely centered around the 
establishment of a Polish border. At this point, all leaders had agreed upon the Eastern frontier of 
Poland and Churchill now stated that there should be compensation in the West, “up to the Oder 
if the Poles so desired.” Churchill also stated that he did not believe that the War Cabinet would 
accept the line of Western Neisse. Most notably, Churchill stated that “some mention should be 
made of the territorial settlement otherwise the whole world would wonder what had been 
decided on this question. There would be some criticism, but nevertheless, it would be better 
than no mention at all.” To this, President Roosevelt replied, “that the Polish Government should 
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be consulted before any statement was made in regard to the Western frontier.”32 The Polish 
border caused tension and disagreement between the allies. Even the question of whether or not 
the Big Three should have considered making a statement on the Western frontier was up to 
debate. The President was correct in his argument that the Polish government should have been 
consulted on these topics and or should have been represented at Yalta.  
On February 10, Prime Minister Churchill cabled the Deputy Prime Minister and the War 
Cabinet to relay the accomplishments of the day. The telegram largely discussed the 
establishment of votes in the United Nations, Poland, and the inclusion of France as a major 
power in the post-war world. Churchill wrote in regard to Poland that “after a prolonged 
struggle, the Foreign Secretary agreed with Americans and Russians on a very good draft about 
Poland last night.” Then, the only remaining point left was for an “agreement for supervising 
voting and also for our informing ourselves properly about what is going on in Poland.33 The 
Polish draft was certainly an accomplishment for the Big Three, however, hesitation and 
suspicion was acknowledged in this message. Churchill admitted that they still needed to find out 
what was happening on the ground in Poland, considering the fact that it was completely 
occupied by the Red Army. 
On February 13, 1945, the Declaration of Liberated Europe was published. The 
agreement between the Big Three outlined many things including: organization of the United 
Nations and its voting procedures, agreements regarding Japan, German reparations and war 
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criminals, German dismemberment, and discussed the future of Eastern Europe. The agreement 
largely discussed Poland and in much more detail than the other countries of Eastern Europe. It 
was stated that: 
A new situation has been created in Poland as a result of her 
complete liberation by the Red Army. This calls for the 
establishment of a Polish Provisional Government which can be 
more broadly based than was possible before the recent liberation of 
the western part of Poland.  The Provisional Government which is 
now functioning in Poland should therefore be reorganized on a 
broader democratic basis with the inclusion of democratic leaders 
from Poland itself and from Poles abroad.  
 
Polish leaders within Poland and from abroad would be included in this government and would 
be pledged to hold “free and unfettered elections… on the basis of universal suffrage and secret 
ballot.” The United States, United Kingdom, and U.S.S.R were to establish formal diplomatic 
relations with the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity and would exchange 
ambassadors. The agreement also established new Polish borders: 
The three heads of Government consider that the eastern frontier of 
Poland should follow the Curzon Line with digressions from it in 
some regions of five to eight kilometers in favor of Poland. They 
recognize that Poland must receive substantial accessions in 
territory in the north and west. They feel that the opinion of the new 
Polish Provisional Government of National Unity should be sought 
in due course of the extent of these accessions and that the final 
delimitation of the western frontier of Poland should thereafter await 
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Churchill wrote to President Roosevelt on February 28, 1945 to detail the current debate 
within Britain concerning the decisions reached on Poland at Yalta. The Prime Minister stated 
that there was “a good deal of uneasiness in both parties” that the West was “letting the Poles 
down.”35 Mainly, the conservatives voiced their discontent with the agreements through what 
Churchill described as a “hostile” amendment in favor of Poland.36 As debate was occurring 
within the British Parliament, President Roosevelt was preparing to sell the Yalta agreements to 
Congress. 
On March 1, 1945 President Roosevelt delivered a speech on the decisions reached at the 
Yalta Conference to Congress. Here, the President outlined many accomplishments, including 
decisions reached on Poland, during his time abroad. Roosevelt began his discussion by stating 
that “One outstanding example of joint action by the three major Allies in the liberated areas was 
the solution reached on Poland” and acknowledged that the Polish question was a “potential 
source of trouble in post-war Europe” but they were still able to find common ground for a 
solution.37 More specifically, Roosevelt outlined the agreements reached on formulating a new 
Polish Provisional Government and new boundaries. The new government was to be more 
representative and to be formed on a “broader democratic basis” which would include Poles from 
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abroad and those in Poland at the present time.38 Furthermore, Roosevelt declared to Congress 
that the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity would be pledged to hold free 
elections as soon as possible.39 
Moreover, President Roosevelt announced that a strong and independent Poland was 
necessary to ensure European security and world peace. The decision respecting the boundaries 
was a “compromise” and the Poles would receive territory in the North and West in exchange for 
what they lost due to the Curzon Line, as exemplified in the map below.40 
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The Western Boundary was to be primarily fixed during the Peace Conference.41 President 
Roosevelt concluded his discussion on Poland by stating that he was “convinced that the 
agreement on Poland… is the most hopeful agreement possible for a free, independent and 
prosperous Polish state.42 However, in a prior draft Roosevelt had written that he must “confess” 
that he was “not completely happy” with respect to the political boundaries of Poland. 
Ultimately, this statement was retracted and stated as a compromise.43 The edit revealed between 
the two drafts is an indication of President Roosevelt’s doubt over the agreements reached on 
Poland. Yet, the President had to maintain that the Polish deal was a good deal and in the spirit 
of compromise to gain congressional support. The tension between the official and public line on 
the agreements reached on Yalta is stark considering that Roosevelt was not satisfied with the 
Polish deal but declared to Congress that it was a deal of compromise and hope. The examination 
of the edited drafts of Roosevelt’s of his message to congress has not been examined closely 
before and is important to highlight to reveal Roosevelt’s doubts over the Polish agreement.  
As March continued, Churchill could sense that there was a deterioration within the Big 
Three alliance. The end of the war and peace with Germany and Japan on the West’s terms 
would not bring “bring much rest” to him and President Roosevelt because there would still be 
much more work to be done to secure international peace. Churchill wrote to Roosevelt that 
“When the war of the giants is over, the wars of the pygmies will begin. There will be a torn, 
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ragged and hungry world to help to its feet: and what will Uncle Joe or his successor say to the 
what we should both like to do it?”44 March was a pivotal point in the Big Three alliance. 
Churchill and Roosevelt quickly realized that the Yalta agreement was interpreted differently by 
Stalin as demonstrated through his actions. The Prime Minister was worried in the present and 
feared what would happen when the war came to a close. 
On March 27, Prime Minister Churchill cabled President Roosevelt in distress. The opening 
sentence revealed that Churchill was “extremely concerned at the deterioration of the Russian 
attitude since Yalta.” The root cause of his distress was largely regarding matters in Poland and 
Eastern Europe. Churchill vented to Roosevelt over Stalin’s interpretations of the Yalta 
agreements and what he had been doing in Poland since the February agreement. Stalin argued 
that only a few other Poles would be added to the new Polish government and that the Russian 
puppets would be consulted first, maintained the right to veto any proposed leaders from the 
West, and ignored his offer to permit outside observers. Later, Churchill went on to address the 
broader implications if the West failed to secure a satisfactory solution on Poland. Churchill had 
advised the critics in the House of Commons to “trust Stalin.” If this were to happen, the world 
would see that they were wrong. All of Eastern Europe would be shown to be excluded from the 
terms of the declaration of Liberated Europe and the West would be excluded from any influence 
in that area.45 Churchill acknowledged that the Polish question was deteriorating the alliance and 
Stalin’s actions contradicted the West’s interpretation of the Yalta agreement. This telegram also 
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revealed that Churchill acknowledged overselling the decisions on Poland at Yalta to the House 
of Commons which had much broader implications. Churchill stated that there was “only one 
possible alternative to confessing our total failure. The alternative is to stand by our 
interpretation of the Yalta declaration.”46 
President Roosevelt expressed his concerns with Russia and Poland on March 29, 1945. The 
President explained that he had “likewise been watching with anxiety and concern the 
development of Soviet attitude since the Crimea Conference.” Here, Roosevelt narrowed in on 
the text of the Crimean Conference which was left to interpretation. The Yalta agreement was a 
“compromise” between the Soviet position that the Lublin Government should be merely 
enlarged and the West’s contention that the government should have started with a clean slate 
and “assist in the formation of an entirely new Polish Government.” Roosevelt concluded his 
message by stating that he agreed with Churchill that “the time has come to take up directly with 
Stalin the broader aspects of the Soviet attitude with particular reference to Poland.”47 By the end 
of March, Roosevelt and Churchill were faced with the reality that the Polish agreements reached 
at Yalta were rapidly failing and would have to confront Stalin over the issue. The new Polish 
Government was not being constructed in accordance to Stalin’s agreement.  
The correspondence revealed that not long after the conclusion of the Yalta Conference, 
Churchill and Roosevelt realized that Stalin was, according to them, violating the terms of the 
Yalta agreements in Poland. Telegrams sent between these two leaders are used by David 
Reynolds and Jon Meacham to depict the aftermath of Yalta Conference, but a large portion of 
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authors avoid telegrams all together. It is especially important that these telegrams be examined 
to better understand the consequences of the Yalta Conference. The actions of Stalin in Poland 
revealed that Churchill and Roosevelt greatly oversold the agreements reached at Yalta. The 
contrast between what was said and agreed upon at Yalta was strikingly different than the public 









































AMERICAN AND BRITISH PRESS REACTIONS:  
SWIFT RESPONSE TO THE YALTA CONFERNCE 
 
Historians have largely neglected public opinion of the Yalta Conference and therefore, 
public sentiment over the agreements reached on Poland have often been excluded from the 
discussion of Yalta and its consequences. For example, David Reynolds briefly acknowledged 
that Republicans in America cited Yalta as an example of appeasement but does not dive into 
details.48 Athan Theoharis examined how the Republican Party attempted to appeal to 
traditionally Democratic ethnic constituencies. Republican strategists would deny the 
inevitability of Poland’s fate by attributing to post-war developments as a result of Democratic 
appeasement, selling out, and betrayal at Yalta.49 McGeorge Bundy articulated that the Yalta 
agreements were short lived and described Harry Hopkins’ mission to Moscow where he 
attempted to patch up the Polish issue. Here, Hopkins warned Stalin that “the future of the 
Roosevelt policy of cooperation depended on favorable public opinion, and that the Polish 
question, with others, was creating grave doubts.”50 But how was Yalta covered in the American 
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press and how did this shape public perception? Largely speaking, public opinion has not been 
included much in the history of Yalta and therefore, I seek to incorporate this into the larger story 
of the conference and its aftermath. The examination of the general public’s opinion is as 
important to understand as the Republican Party and American-Polish community’s opinion. 
Although the press in the United States and Britain praised their respected leaders for their 
success at the Yalta Conference, there was also critique over the agreements regarding Poland, 
particularly by those of Polish association. There was a tension between the official line of the 
agreements at Yalta and a public line which was set to sell the Yalta wholesale as an 
achievement for the establishment of the post-war world.  
 
The American Press:  
“President Roosevelt betrayed not only Poland, but the hundreds of Polish-Americans who 
trusted him to uphold the principles of freedom which have guided America from its earliest 
days.” 
Chicago Tribune, “F.D.R Betrayed all at Yalta, Poles Charge” 51 
 
Two sides of the Crimean Conference were revealed through the American press. One 
being government officials’ support for the decisions reached at the Conference and the second 
being a minority of government officials, mostly Republicans, and members of the Polish 
community in America who criticized the Yalta agreement, largely over the decisions made for 
the future of Poland. The majority who supported the Yalta agreement largely argued that the 
decisions at Crimea should be adopted in support of President Roosevelt, the alliance, and for  
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Future cooperation with the alliance. On the other side, the vocal minority, being a number of 
Republicans in Congress and the Polish community, voiced their dissatisfaction with the decisions 
made for Poland at Yalta which they argued contradicted the Atlantic Charter and legalized Soviet 
interference in Polish internal affairs. The vocal minority was proven to be correct not too long 
after the Conference between the Big Three. On March 30, 1945, Stalin “scrapped the Yalta 
formula on Poland in which he promised President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill the 
provisional Communist government he set up in Poland at Lublin would be broadened to include 
members of the Polish government in London.”52  
Representative O’Konski, who was a Republican, voiced sharp criticisms over the 
agreements reached at Yalta just two days after the conclusion of the Conference. O’Konski 
interrupted the House of Representatives to denounce the Crimean Big-Three agreement as a 
“sell-out of Poland” after fellow members Representative Helen Gahagan Douglas (D-
California) and Representative Luther A. Johnson (D-Texas) had praised the results from the 
Conference. The actions taken by the Big Three were condemned as a betrayal “to the most 
freedom-loving people, the Poles, who have done more to crush Nazism than any other nation on 
Earth.” 53 O’Kinski hyperbolically claimed the actions of the Big Three were a betrayal to 
Poland.54 Just two days after the conclusion of the Conference, a division was seen in Congress 
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over the interpretation of the agreements reached by the Allied Powers. Here, it can be seen that 
Democrats Douglas and Johnson were quick to sing praise over the agreements reached at Yalta 
but were condemned by Republican O’Konski. In Russia, Representative O’Konski was attacked 
by Pravda, a Communist party newspaper of the Soviet Union, for his criticism of the Yalta 
declaration on Poland. Pravda claimed that O’Konski had given fascist propaganda concerning 
liberated Poland and declared that it was surprising that some Republicans in the House 
approved of his stance.55 Although Pravda represented a Stalinist point of view, it is important to 
note the official communist line which was to maintain the Polish agreements in their terms. The 
Communist paper seemed almost shocked that a member of Congress would go against the 
Commander in Chief and attempted to label O’Konski and other claims Republican’s made as 
absurd. The paper from Russia grouped the American dissenting opinions of the Conference as 
being those of the Republican Party, although not the entire party.  
On the same day that Representative O’Konski voiced his disapproval over the 
conclusions reached at Yalta, Charles Rosmarek, president of the Polish-American Congress, 
deplored the territorial adjustments outlined by the Big Three. Rosmarek declared their decision 
a “direct contradiction to all sacred pledges of the Atlantic Charter” and a horrible blow to the 
cause of freedom. The “docile submission” to Russia’s demands for the lands seized during the 
partitions of Poland as Germany’s collaborator was a distortion of Polish war aims and 
reaffirmed the Molotov-Ribbentrop line of 1939.56  Charles Rosmarek and the Polish-American 
Congress represented the majority of Polish-Americans in their discontent over the Yalta 
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Conference. The Polish-Americans argued that the territorial adjustments outlined at the 
Conference directly contradicted the Atlantic Charter which featured Roosevelt’s vision for a 
postwar world which featured open trade, self-determination, collective security, and 
disarmament. While many were singing praises for the agreements reached at the Conference, 
there was a Polish minority who criticized the contradictions between the Atlantic Charter and 
what was decided at Yalta.  
On February 15, 1945, Raymond Daniell of the New York Times reported from London 
that “President Roosevelt tried his best at Yalta to get Premier Stalin to agree to let reconstituted 
Poland keep Lwow,” which he ultimately failed to do. Prime Minister Churchill and President 
Roosevelt accepted and recognized Russia’s territorial claims and in turn, made certain 
agreements on the new government to supplant the London exiles and the Provisional 
Government sponsored by Russia. The government would feature a broad and representative 
base. Premier Stalin seemed to make it clear that he had no intentions of interfering with the 
domestic affairs of the new Polish state. Furthermore, Daniell described that the Poles in London 
were confused over the agreements. Premier Tomsaz Arciszewski’s government refused to have 
any part of the Yalta settlement, holding that it was a violation of the Atlantic Charter. The 
Peasant Party of the former Premier Stanslaw Mikolajozyk was unanimously in favor of co-
operation with the powers. The Socialist Party was torn between the sides of Arciszewski and the 
Peasant Party.57 Daniell described the confusion amongst the Poles in London and identified a 
division within the Polish community. Poles in London were split over whether or not to accept 
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the agreements reached at Yalta. Poles from the Arciszewski government held a valid argument 
that the decisions reached on Poland violated the terms of the Atlantic Charter. The Peasant Party 
also held a valid stance that they should support the cooperation between the powers. Daniell’s 
reporting revealed the mixed reactions to the Yalta in Poland and portrayed confusion amongst 
the Poles.  
On a local level, Rhode Island reflected similar divisions over the Polish agreements. 
Joseph Janas, president of the Polish-American Council of Rhode Island, stated that 
representatives would meet on February 18th at Central Falls to draft a protest which would be 
sent to the Secretary of State and members of both branches of Congress. Janas claimed that 
information was coming to Americans of Polish extraction which indicated that Poles in Poland 
who were loyal to the government in exile were either being murdered by Russians or sent to 
Siberia. He also expressed fear in that the upcoming secret election in Poland agreed upon at 
Yalta would be a “joke because it will be controlled by the Russian secret police” who now 
completely controlled Poland.58 Janas, who was speaking on behalf of the Polish people in 
Rhode Island, made it clear to the press and to the United States government what their stance 
was on decisions made at Yalta. Many Poles in Rhode Island did not accept Russia’s free hand to 
exercise control over Polish internal affairs. An examination of Janas’ activism revealed the deep 
discontent for the Yalta agreement felt by many Poles in Rhode Island.  
However, the public was not simply split in favor of or in opposition to the agreements 
reached on Poland at the Yalta Conference; there was a large portion of the public who was 
uneducated on the matter. Several polls conducted by the Office of Public Research following 
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the conclusion of the Yalta Conference reveal both confusion and division over the topic. One 
survey question asked 1,244 individuals a very general question which stated, “Do you think it 
(the Big Three agreement on Poland) was fair or unfair to Poland.” As illustrated below, 34% 
reported that the Big Three was fair, 27% unfair, and that 39% did not know.59
Foremost, the Office of Public Research acknowledged that there was public division in asking if 
the Big Three were fair to Poland at Yalta. The results displayed that the Polish question asked 
by surveyors revealed a sense a division amongst the American public. It is certainly noteworthy 
that the percentage of respondents who viewed the treatment of Poland either as “Fair” or 
“Unfair” were almost equal, although there is a 7% difference in favor of it being “Fair.” 
However, it is also important to note that the largest group was neither; the largest group was 
39% who responded that they did not know. This statistic revealed that the majority of the public 
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was not concerned over the Polish treatment at Yalta, nor the Polish situation. The West could 
oversell the Yalta Agreement, especially agreements reached on Poland, due to the ignorance 
and lack of care within the democratic bases. The general public was more focused on 
compromise, peace, and cooperation rather than the fine details of the agreement.  
Also, during the month of February, 1,244 individuals were asked by Roosevelt’s Office of 
Public Opinion Research “At the conference of the Big Three, an agreement was reached on the 
question of which government should be recognized for Poland. Do you happen to know which 
of these governments was agreed upon by the Big Three?” The four possible answers included: 
the Lublin government, the exiled Polish government in London, a new Polish government to be 
made up of these governments and from other Polish groups, and don’t know. As depicted 
below, only 19% of respondents knew the correct answer which was “A new Polish government 
to be made up of people from both of these governments and from other Polish groups.” The 
overwhelming majority, 59%, recorded that they did not know which government would be 
recognized for Poland.60 The poll, exemplified on the following page, revealed that a large 
portion of the public did not know important details which made up the Polish agreement in 
Yalta.  
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The majority of the public was largely ignorant over the details of the Polish agreement 
reached at Yalta and therefore, the Polish issues did not matter to many. The first poll revealed 
that 39% of respondents did not know if the Big Three agreement on Poland was fair or unfair, 
and the second poll revealed that 80% of respondents did not know or answered incorrectly on 
which government would be recognized for Poland. Therefore, issues over Poland did not matter 
to many citizens. Roosevelt did not need to worry about Polish sentiment because by the time of 
Yalta, he had already been re-elected and had less reason to worry about Polish sentiment within 
the United States.61 Afterall, there were only five or six million Poles in America at the time.62 
Ultimately, the Polish American Congress came together after the Yalta Conference and gave 
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immediate and sharp criticism. President Rozmarek argued the agreement abandoned the 
Atlantic Charter and implied that Roosevelt and Churchill were just as guilty as Stalin. The 
Polish American Congress was deeply hurt by the decisions and felt abandoned, especially 
because over 90% of the Polish community voted for Roosevelt in 1944.63 The general public 
was ignorant over the Polish agreements, but the Polish community felt deeply betrayed by 
Roosevelt.  
The Evening Star, a Washington D.C. paper, discussed British affairs in the Commons 
following their vote to defeat a motion of protest against the Big Three’s plan for the future of 
Poland. The House of Commons overwhelmingly defeated the motion by 396 to 25. The vote 
followed Foreign Secretary Eden’s argument to the Commons that when the Polish settlement 
was final, Poland would be as strong if not stronger than the state which existed in 1939.64 The 
memorandum in the Commons which was defeated revealed the minority dissent regarding the 
plan for the future of Poland. The article displayed to the American public that the majority of 
officials in London viewed the Yalta agreement positively. The Evening Star’s account of the 
motion filed in the Commons revealed that much like in America, only a minority was in dissent 
of the Polish agreements reached in Yalta.  
Sumner Welles, the former Under Secretary of State, weighed his opinion that overall, 
Yalta was a major accomplishment which “will always stand out as a gigantic step toward the 
ultimate establishment of a peaceful and orderly world.” Welles described how it was easy for 
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people to pick out flaws but concluded that “in the larger sense, the practical accomplishments 
obtained at Yalta far outweigh all valid objections which can be raised.” Four “outstanding 
achievements” were cited by Sumner which included: the announcement of the United Nations 
meeting in San Francisco on April 25, the inflexible purpose to destroy German militarism and  
Nazism, the decision reached concerning the future of Poland, and the joint agreement of the 
three major powers to aid the liberated peoples of Europe by democratic means which assured 
the United States would see a full role post-war Europe.65 Welles’ article, with the insight of a 
former government official, attempted to quell criticisms of Yalta and cast it in a positive light.  
In a letter to the editor of the New York Times, Daniel Seligman argued that the most serious 
difficulty with the Yalta was not the territorial question, but rather the violation of the Atlantic 
Charter. Specifically, Seligman cited the flagrant violations of self-determination, freedom of 
fear, and use of force in international relations to be abandoned. The letter concluded that if the 
United States found themselves unable to stem the totalitarian wave, they should not delude 
themselves into thinking that the vicious outrage represented a just settlement.66 Seligman voiced 
a popular argument that the Big Three’s decisions at Yalta contradicted the Atlantic Charter’s 
statement of self-determination. Due to this violation, the Soviets were now interfering with 
Polish domestic affairs through systematic deportations, murders, and strong-arm methods. 
Seligman voiced that the devastated people of Eastern Europe should have a chance to work 
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things out for themselves, which was the view of many. In an ideal scenario, self-determination 
would be the plausible solution, but the fact was that the Red Army controlled Poland and most 
of Eastern Europe and the Declaration of Liberated Europe was being enforced through Stalin’s 
terms.  
William Henry from the Wall Street Journal described the uncertainty of the alliance 
between the United States and Russia and questioned whether they could “do business with 
Stalin.” Although there had been bright moments in the alliance, new developments such as the 
aggravation of the Polish situation revealed that there were conflicts of interest between the two 
emerging powers. Henry cited Russia’s past actions to examine whether or not the United States 
and Russia could do business together which included: the violation of non-aggression treaties, 
disregard for the principles of the Atlantic Charter, and the violation of the Yalta agreement in 
Poland. The article warned of appeasement and Soviet unilateral action.67 By May 1945, the 
alliance was beginning to crumble due to Stalin’s broken promises. For the West, the breaking 
point in the relationship was Stalin’s actions in Poland which, to them, blatantly violated terms 
of the Atlantic Charter and the agreements reached at Yalta. President Roosevelt’s trust in Stalin 
led him to believe that the Soviets would follow international agreements. However, the Soviets 
viewed the Yalta agreement as “just another scrap of paper.”68 
The Polish community in the United States quickly criticized the agreements reached on 
Poland at the Yalta Conference through the press. Articles such as those of Joseph Janas and 
Daniel Seligmann’s letter to the editor displayed public discontent with the result of the Yalta 
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Conference. The common argument was that the agreement blatantly violated terms of the 
Atlantic Charter and the Big Three’s decision did not represent the will of the Poles. The polling 
done during the February 1945 depicted the public division over whether or not Poland was 
treated fairly by the Big Three, although a large portion of the public was unsure on the matter. 
There was a clear tension between the government line on the decisions reached at Yalta and 
public opinion. The general public did not care about the Polish agreements and the Polish 
community greatly cared and were dissatisfied with the agreements of Yalta.  
 
 
The British Press:  
“The Polish Government declares that the decisions of the Three-Power conference concerning 
Poland cannot be recognized by the Polish Government and cannot bind the Polish Nation.”  
The Times, “The Polish Refusal: Charge of Fifth Partition: Curzon Line”69 
 
On February 13th, 1945, the Times in London articulated that “unbound satisfaction was 
expressed in London last night with the results of the Crimea Conference.” Only eight days were 
needed to reach decisions on numerous matters which revealed the constructive and friendly 
spirit in which all parties approached their tasks.70 The Times asserted that the “Polish question,” 
was to be regarded as one of the greatest achievements for the conference. The new democratic 
Provisional Government that was to be formed representative of all democratic Poles and the 
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acceptance of the Curzon Line with slight modifications were acclaimed to be major successes.71  
The Diplomatic Correspondent for the Times attempted to express the satisfaction with the 
results of the Conference on behalf of himself and other London officials. However, the 
Diplomatic Correspondent did not make any critiques of the Conference and seemingly 
wholeheartedly took the results as a success for the nation, for the alliance, and for the world.  
 The following day, another article in the Times described how prior to the meeting at 
Yalta, the Polish Government handed the governments of Britain and the United States a 
memorandum in which Poland expressed its hopes that these governments would not make any 
decisions without the consultation and consent of the Polish government. The memorandum 
stated that Poland was willing to seek a solution through international procedure and with due 
respect for the rights of the two parties concerned. Ultimately, the method adopted was “a 
contradiction of the elementary principles binding the allies and constitutes a violation of the 
letter and spirit of the Atlantic Charter and the right of every nation to defend its own 
interests.”72 The Polish government in exile quickly critiqued the Conference which rapidly 
appeared in the London press. Polish Prime Minister Arciszewski and the Cabinet made striking 
but accurate accusations that the plans outlined at Yalta not only contradicted the Polish 
government’s memorandum, but also the Atlantic Charter itself.  
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The Polish Government declared that the decisions made at Yalta concerning Poland 
“cannot be recognized by the Polish Government and cannot bind the Polish nation.”73 The 
intention to create a provisional government by enlarging the foreign appointed Lublin 
Committee with persons vaguely described as being democratic leaders from Poland and abroad 
only legalized Soviet interference in Polish affairs.74 The Polish government in exile strongly 
criticized the decision to appoint democratic leaders from Poland and abroad. This, they argued, 
would give the Soviets a hand into the internal affairs of Poland which would undermine the 
Polish war aims of self-determination. The exiled government in London wanted to determine 
the future of their state by themselves.  
 The British Press aimed to describe America’s interpretation of the Yalta agreements and 
concur with American sentiment. In America, the press was singing almost in unison its praise of 
the Yalta declaration, although there were occasional newspapers which interpreted its details as 
a victory for Russia. However, the great majority accepted it as “important and encouraging that 
a spirit of compromise ruled over the meeting and, in spite of prompt and angry statements from 
Polish groups, cite the agreement concerning Poland as a case in point.”75 It is especially unique 
that the London press examined public opinion in America. The description of American opinion 
captured the overwhelming positive consent of the agreements made at Yalta and praised the 
leader’s ability to compromise as a sign of encouragement in international cooperation. The press 
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voiced that there was simply a minority of Republicans who interpreted the conference as a win 
for Russia and acknowledged the Polish discontent in America.  
On March 2nd, 1945, both Houses approved the Crimean decisions and Lord Addison 
took it upon himself to associate himself “whole-heartedly” with what had been said of the 
labors of the Prime Minister. He was glad to see the work being done to demilitarize Germany 
and proclaimed that the increased unity between “the great allies was largely due to the frankness 
of the Prime Minister and his readiness to face difficulties.” Addison further believed that the 
“Curzon line was, in main, as fair a boundary as could be drawn” and was not another partition 
of Poland. Further in regard to the to be established representative provisional government, 
Addison believed that the “Record of the Russian Government in their dealings with this country 
and the business world, long before the war, was a fine one, and the Prime Minister was fully 
warranted in protesting against the suggestion that our Russian allies were not going to play 
fair.”76 Government officials largely utilized the press to show their support for the agreements 
reached at Yalta and the decisions made by Prime Minister Churchill. Addison’s account 
revealed the outpouring support from the government for the country’s leader and is reflective of 
the Houses decision to adopt the Yalta agreements. However, there was some skepticism 
regarding Poland voiced by Earl De La Warr, who was a member of the House of Lords:  
It was not so much the agreement about Poland that was 
concerning some people but how the agreement was going to be 
carried out. They all hesitated to express any question of the good 
faith of any of our allies. They all felt extremely hopeful that this 
matter would in fact be adjusted according to the lines laid down in 
the agreement. What is the machinery to be set up for ensuring 
it?... He hoped that in our dealings with Russia we, as a nation, 
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would speak straight to those with whom we were dealing and 
make them realize that we regarded cooperation with them as 
absolutely essential not only to our mutual relations but to the 
future peace of the world, and that if we were prepared to give 
cooperation we were prepared to ask for it. Cooperation must be 
real; it must not be appeasement. The Lordships should give their 
whole-hearted endorsement to the agreement, and insist on its 
being carried out because in its carrying out British honour was at 
stake.77 
 
Earl De La Warr argued that all members should support the Prime Minister when he attended 
conferences such as Yalta so that he would attend knowing that the British were behind him.78 
Although Earl De La Warr voiced his concerns over the practicality of the agreements and 
warned of appeasement, he ultimately embraced it for the sake of British reputation and honor. 
Even those within the government who had their reservations about the meeting and the 
agreements supported it in the spirit of the British cooperation within the alliance.  
 Although individual responses to the Yalta Agreements in the papers were scarcer than 
the American papers, a letter to the editor of The Times depicted disapproval over the methods of 
the Lublin Committee. The Yalta pledge to hold free and unfettered elections reaffirmed the 
Atlantic Charter, but the methods of the Lublin Committee breached, in word and action, the 
article. The author argued that the Lublin Committee was entitled to participation but not 
domination.79 The disapproval voiced by the author was not so much in the actual text of the 
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agreement, but more in the carrying out of it. The letter to the editor revealed that dissatisfaction 
was present in the public with the aftermath of the agreements reached in Poland.  
 The stances taken by the British press on the Yalta Conference proved to be strikingly 
similar to those displayed in the American press. In Britain, a majority of government officials’ 
opinions voiced throughout the papers were supportive of Prime Minister Churchill and the 
agreements he reached with the alliance. I believe that the Yalta agreements were largely 
accepted in the Commons to uphold Britain’s status and honor. Papers praised the spirit of 
compromise and cooperation rather than critiquing the actual text of the agreement. Much like in 
the United States, there were few government officials who avoided giving full support of the 
agreements and sided with Polish groups in Britain, especially the Polish government in exile. 
Ultimately, the majority of American citizens did not care and or were ignorant about the Yalta 
agreements and their fairness to Poland. However, the Polish community in the United States as 
well as the Poles in exile in London were quick to argue that the agreements made on Poland at 
Yalta violated the terms of the Atlantic Charter. The majority of criticism in the press stemmed 
from people with Polish relation and opponents of President Roosevelt. America was willing to 























 The debates over the “Polish Question” at the Yalta Conference is the central factor of 
the deterioration of relations among the Big Three. Issues over the establishment of the Polish 
border and the formation of a new provisional government were contested throughout the 
Plenary Sessions and resulted in the compromise stated in the Declaration of Liberated Europe. It 
was Stalin’s actions in Poland which violated the terms of the agreement and led to the demise of 
the alliance. Roosevelt and Churchill greatly oversold the agreements reached on Poland at Yalta 
to their governments and to their people. Due to Roosevelt’s recent re-election and an ignorant 
public who lacked knowledge on the agreements, he was able to oversell the agreements under 
the guise of cooperation. The press revealed that only the Republicans in Congress and people of 
Polish association voiced their discontent with the agreements and claimed that it was a violation 
of the terms stated in the Atlantic Charter. Telegrams sent between Roosevelt and Churchill 
following the Conference reveal that Stalin’s actions in Poland was the cause of friction in the 
alliance and the two struggled to address the crisis. Poland was the central issue at the Yalta 
Conference which resulted in a compromise that favored Stalin and caused the deterioration of 
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